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easement owner was entitled to the award because he was not responsible for the happening of the condition subsequent. 40 This is improper
reasoning unless the court considers an easement a determinable fee.
This conclusion was rejected in Shaw v. Williams, indicating that an
easement was an estate less than a determinable fee.41 The rule as set
down in Kearney v. Francher, indicates the easement is extinguished
when the purpose becomes physically impossible to execute. Under the
present case, this would not occur until the easement was actually
inundated with water. Therefore, the easement would not be terminated
at time of condemnation, and the owner of the easement would be
entitled to the award. Once the easement, as well as the servient tenement, had both been condemned by the same authority, the easement
would be extinguished, not because of abandonment, but because of
the merger of two interests in a common owner.4 2 In any event, the
landowner must have acquired title to the easement prior to the taking
of his interest by eminent domain.
J. M. Holbrook
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Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.

Sup. 1970).
In 1953, the City of Austin filed a petition in eminent domain seeking to condemn a tract of land owned by Hall. Special commissioners
were appointed and made an award to which Hall filed objections on
grounds of inadequacy. In 1966, after completion of a freeway across
part of the tract, Hall filed amended objections alleging that the city
had taken more land than it needed and that the city should be stopped
from taking that portion not used for freeway purposes. Pursuant to
Rule 174(b), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,' Hall filed a motion for
a separate trial on the issues of whether the city had a right to condemn
40 13 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 178, 180 (Feb. 7, 1970); State v. Independent School Dist. No. 31,
124 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Minn. 1963).

41 Shaw v. Williams, 332 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, no writ).

42 Howell v. Estes, 71 Tex. 690, 12 S.W. 62 (1888); THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, § 449,

p. 801 (1962).
I Tx. R. Civ. P. 174(b) reads:
Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party claims, or issues.
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that portion not used for freeway and whether the city's right to condemn was excessive and arbitrary in that it condemned more land than
it needed. The motion was granted and judgment entered that the city
take nothing as to that portion of the lot not used for freeway purposes.
No disposition was made with respect to the portion occupied by the
freeway. The Austin Court of Civil Appeals assumed jurisdiction of the
case, 2 evidently on the basis that an order for a separate trial under
Rule 174(b) is a final and appealable judgment the same as an order of
severance under Rule 41, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.8 HeldReversed and Appeal Dismissed. An appeal from judgment entered pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 174(b), Separate Trials, is interlocutory and there is no basis for treating an order for a separate trial
as an order of severance.
In the past some members of the legal profession have been confused
as to the distinction between an order of severance and an order for
a separate trial. 4 In 1961, the Texas Supreme Court in Kansas University Endowment Association v. King5 specifically pointed out that there
is a distinction: "Any statements in our former opinions indicating that
Rule 174 deals with severance are incorrect and should be disregarded. '"6
The trial judge had entered an order of severance under Rule 174(b).
Justice Walker, speaking for the court, pointed out that the trial judge
probably had been led into this error because of earlier, confusing decisions of the supreme court and other courts where severance and separate trial were treated as being synonymous. The Texas Supreme
Court, however, took jurisdiction of the cause, indicating thereby, that
the trial court's action was in effect the same as if a severance had been
ordered under Rule 41. The court held the order of severance erroneous
because the severed portion was not capable of being an independent
cause of action and the facts were so interwoven as to work a hardship
2 City of Austin v. Hall, 446 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), rev'd, 450 S.W.2d
836 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
8 Mayfair Building Corp. v. Oak Forest Bank, 441 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1969, no writ). Although the court rendered the correct decision, it stated: "The
(Emorder ... did not expressly direct a severance as authorized under Rule 174.
phasis added.) Rule 41 provides:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
or added, or suits filed separately may be consolidated, or actions which have been
improperly joined may be severed and each ground of recovery improperly joined
may be docketed as a separate suit between the same parties, by order of the court
on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action, before the
time of submission to the jury or to the court if trial is without a jury, on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with
separately. (Emphasis added.)
4 See Hall, Severance and Separate Trial in Texas, 36 TEXAS L. REv. 339 (1958); Heardon, Appealable Judgments and Orders, in State Bar of Texas, A'PELLATE PROcZOURE IN
TEXAS § 2.8 [11 (1964).
5 162 Tex. 599, 850 S.W.2d 11 (1961).
GId. at 612, 350 S.W.2d at 19.
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on the parties. The court did not hold that an order of severance under
Rule 174(b) is interlocutory; on the contrary, its action allowed a trial
judge to mistakenly order a severance under a rule for separate trials.
Justice Walker, however, pointed out the distinction between Rule
174(b) and Rule 41:
A severance divides the lawsuit into two or more independent
causes, each of which terminates in a separate, final and enforceable judgment. The separate trial contemplated by Rule 174 results
in an interlocutory order determining the claims or issues so tried,
but there is only one final judgment which is entered after all
claims and issues involved in the suit have been tried.
An issue that is tried separately under Rule 174 need not constitute a complete lawsuit in itself. Severance is proper, however,
only where the suit involves two or more separate and distinct
causes of action. Each of the causes into which the action is severed
must be such that the same might properly be tried and determined if it were the only claim in controversy. (Citations omitted.)
A severable cause of action may be tried separately under the provisions of Rule 174, but an issue that might properly be the subject
of a separate trial is not necessarily severable 7 (Emphasis added.)
A judgment is required to be final before it can be heard by either
a court of civil appeals or the supreme court, unless an appeal is specifically provided by law.8 Even if the order of severance is erroneous,
a judgment based upon the severed portion is final, 9 although it may
be set aside on appeal; but a failure to object to an order of severance
at the trial level is a waiver of that objection on appeal.10 The appealability of a judgment does not depend upon whether the action is
severable, is capable of being erroneously severed, or whether it should
have been severed." Though an action is severable, an express order
of severance is necessary; and the doctrine of "severance by implication"
has been expressly rejected. 2
7Id.

at 611.12, 350 S.W.2d at 19.
8 Tax. CoNST. art. V, § 6; Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2249 (1964); TEx. R. Civ. P.
301; North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Sup.
1966); Steeple Oil and Gas Corporation v. Amend, 394 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Sup. 1965);
Palmer v. D.O.K.K. Benevolent and Insurance Association, 160 Tex. 513, 334 S.W.2d 149
(1960); Thomas v. Shult, 436 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968,
no writ); Myers v. Smitherman, 279 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, no
writ).
9 Schieffer v. Patterson, 43 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Grossenbacher v. Burket, 427
S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Pierce v. Reynolds, 160 Tex. 198, 329 S.W.2d 76 (1959).
10 Pierce v. Reynolds, 160 Tex. 198, 329 S.W.2d 76 (1959).
11 Pierce v. Reynolds, 160 Tex. 198, 829 S.W.2d 76 (1959); Pan American Petroleum
Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200 (1959).
12 Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324
S.W.2d 200 (1959); Thomas v. Shult, 436 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1968, no writ). In Thomas the father and mother of the deceased, Reginald Thomas, Jr.,
brought suit against Rigo Manufacturing Company, manufacturer of a chemical compound
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In 1962, the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals, with procedural facts
before it similar to those in Kansas University Endowment Association,
dismissed an appeal1" on a finding that the judgment was interlocutory
and not a final and appealable judgment as required by Rule 301.14
The trial judge ordered that the defendant's claim be severed and given
a separate docket number.15 Judgment was entered on the plaintiff's
action; but no disposition was made of defendant's claim.' 6 Chief Justice Massey, writing for the majority, stated:
There is no provision of law under which appeal is provided under
these circumstances. With certain statutory exceptions, an order,
judgment or decree, whether at law or equity, must possess the
essential characteristic of finality before any appeal will lie therefrom.'7
The case of Schieffer v. Patterson,8 points out clearly that the problems arising from a lack of understanding of the distinction between an
order of severance and an order for a separate trial can keep the litigants
fighting in the courts over procedural points, while any decision on the
merits must wait until another day. Joy Patterson brought a damage suit
against Larry Schieffer, against whom a default judgment was rendered.
He, thereafter, moved that the judgment be set aside and that he be
granted a new trial. The trial judge overruled his motion except insoknown as "Kill-Ko Bug Killer," for allegedly having caused Reginald's death and against
Dr. Shult, who allegedly negligently treated Reginald for his sickness, after having drunk
the compound. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Rigo on May 7, 1968, making
no mention of the cause against Dr. Shult and having entered no order of severance.
On May 23, judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Shult, making no mention of the prior
disposition of Rigo. The parents appealed both judgments. The court of appeals held that
both judgments are interlocutory, that no severance was ordered as to the two causes,
that there can be no severance by implication, and there can be only one final judgment;
therefore, there is no final judgment in the case as it stands and the appeal must be dismissed.
But see Southern Ins. Co. v. Federal Service Finance Corp., 370 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1963, writ dism'd), where the courts found that there had been a "constructive severance." Although there does not seem to be a Texas Supreme Court case expressly rejecting a doctrine of "constructive severance," these cases should be followed
with some hesitancy. The only difference between a "constructive severance" and "severance by implication" is semantic. Evan v. Young County Lumber Co., 368 S.W.2d 783
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, no writ); Warner Electric Brake & Clutch Co. v.
Bessemer Forging Co., 343 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13 Allison v. Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co., 353 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1962, no writ).
14 TEX. R. CIv. P. 301.
'5Allison v. Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co., 353 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1962, no writ). The trial judge ordered a severance under Rule 174.
16 Id. The case is unclear as to whether defendant's claim was a cross-claim or compulsory counterclaim.
17 Id. But see Justice Renfro's dissent in same case. The chief justice seems to have
overlooked the cases holding that an order of severance no matter how erroneous is a
final appealable judgment. The court should have entertained the appeal and remanded
for reconsolidation if it was an improper severance.
18 430 S,W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968), rev'd, 433 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Sup. 1964),
on remand 440 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ).
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far as it asked for a new trial on the issue of damages. Schieffer excepted
and gave notice of appeal. Nearly a month later, he filed a motion to
sever the default judgment from the damage issue and the motion was
granted. The defendant Schieffer appealed the default judgment. The
court of civil appeals held that the judgment was interlocutory and must,
therefore, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the cause to the court of civil appeals for
consideration on its merits, expressly stating, however, "Our holding
in this case is not to be taken as approving the trial court's order severing the issues of liability and damages."' 19
On remand, the court of civil appeals, per Chief Justice Phillips,
held that the allegations in plaintiff's original petition would not
support a default judgment and that defendant be granted a new trial
20
on all issues.
The confusion concerning the distinction between an order of severance and an order for a separate trial still persists in some degree since
the Kansas decision. The fine judicial reasoning required has not been
fully appreciated. Be that as it may, it seems certain that a judgment
entered pursuant to a severed cause of action under Rule 41 is a final
judgment for purposes of appeal2l no matter how erroneous. Even, unfortunately, a judgment entered in a severed cause under Rule 174(b)
is final, if the trial judge puts the word "sever" in his order and gives
that cause a separate docket number. This particular laxity does not
help distinguish between Rule 41 and Rule 174(b) and seems to allow
cases to be appealed piecemeal. As the Texas Supreme Court pointed
out in the principal case:
An order for a separate trial leaves the lawsuit intact but enables
the court to hear and determine one or more issues without trying
all controverted issues at the same hearing. The order entered at
the conclusion of a separate trial is often interloc[u]tory, because
no final and appealable judgment can properly be rendered until
22
all of the controlling issues have been tried and decided.
The problem can be eliminated by careful drafting of the motion by
trial counsel. It seems that an attorney has enough work trying his case
on the merits without spending extra, valuable time locked in combat
over a procedural point that can be understood.
James A. Smith
19 Schieffer v. Patterson, 433 S.W.2d 418, 419 (rex. Sup. 1964). See Iley v. Hughes, 158
Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958), holding that it is improper to sever the liability
from the damage issue in a tort action.
20 Schieffer v. Patterson, 440 S.W. 2d 124 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ).
21 See Continental Bus Systems, Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 13 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
164 (Jan. 28, 1970) rendered the same day as the Hall case.
22 Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
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